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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
KIPP PHILLIPS, DENNIS HORN, 
and JERRY MCCRIGHT, 
Defendants and Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from the Court's memorandum decision up-
holding the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended, concerning the 
regulation of pornographic material, and a finding of guilt 
of each defendant for distributing pornographic material. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellants were convicted and sentenced in the Ogden 
City Court and appealed their conviction to the Second 
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah. Each appellant 
had been charged seperately for distributing pornographic 
material under Utah Code Annotated, 76-10-1204, 1953, as 
amended. Upon stipulation of the facts by counsel, the 
cases were consolidated for decision, the sole issue being 
the constitutionality of the statute. The Second District 
Court, the Honorable Calvin Gould, presiding, upheld the 
City Court conviction, and held Utah Code Annotated, 
76-10-1204, 1953, as amended, constitutional. 
Case No. 
13816 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully request this Court to set aside 
the convictions on the grounds that the statute under which 
they were convicted is unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants were convicted and sentenced in the Ogden 
City Court of Ogden City, County of Weber, Utah, for hav-
ing distributed pornographic material, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended. 
They appealed their convictions, and the matter was set for 
trial de novo in the Second Judicial District Court with the 
Honorable Calvin Gould presiding. 
It was stipulated that the exhibits were obtained by 
Ogden City Police officers from the appellants while acting 
as employees of the Adult Book and Cinema Store in 
Ogden, Utah. Whether the exhibits under a properly drafted 
statute would be pornographic was not at issue in District 
Court and is not at issue here. 
Appellants moved to dismiss their complaints on the 
ground that Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-10-1204, 
1953, as amended, is unconstitutional on its face, and of 
no effect whatsoever. Counsel submitted written memor-
andums after which the Court issued its memorandum 
decision holding the statute constitutional and finding each 
appellant guilty as charged. 
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ARGUMENT 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 76-10-1204, 
1953, AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE, INDEFINITE, AND OVERBROAD, IN SUCH A 
WAY THAT SAID STATUTE VIOLATES THE APPEL-
LANTS' RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE FIRST AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 
15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Appellants are charged with knowingly distributing 
pornographic material to others in violation of Section 
76-10-1204 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
Pornographic material is defined in Section 76-10-
1203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, as follows: 
" 1 . Any material or performance is pornographic 
if, considered as a whole, applying contemporary 
community standards: 
(a) Its predominant appeal is to prurient 
interest; and, 
(b) It goes substantially beyond customary 
limits of candor in the description or 
representation of nudity, sex, or ex-
cretion. 
2. In any prosecution dealing with an offense re-
lating to pornographic material or performances, 
the question whether the predominant appeal of 
material or of a performance is to prurient 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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interest shall be determined with reference to 
average adults,. 
3. Neither the prosecution nor the defense shall 
be required to introduce expert witness testimony 
concerning the pornographic character of the 
material or performance which is the subject of a 
prosecution of this part." 
This definition leaves appellants in a hopeless quandry 
in assessing the limits of protection provided by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution, and Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
These provisions are set forth below: 
First Amendment: Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press ... 
Fourteenth Amendment: No state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law, 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, Section 15: No law shall be passed to 
abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of 
the press. 
The Utah law governing pornography was passed in 
March, 1973 in an attempt to adopt a tough position on 
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pornography in light of the then existing decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court; however the constitutional 
concepts were vastly changed by a series of United States 
Supreme Court decisions announced June 21, 1973, begin-
ning with Miller v. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, (1973). 
I n Miller, the Court stated: 
"We acknowledge however, the inherent dangers 
of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. 
State statutes designed to regulate obscene 
materials must be carefully limited. As a result, 
we now confine the permissible scope of such 
regulation to works which depict or describe 
sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically 
defined by the applicable state law as written or 
authoritatively construed. A state offense must 
also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, 
appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which 
portray sexual conduct in a patiently offensive 
way, and which taken as a whole, do not have 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value." at page 430. 
The Supreme Court then adopted the new guidelines 
that are to be the minimum standard for state statutes to 
constitutionally regulate obscene material, to-wit: 
(a) Whether the average person, applying contempor-
ary community standards would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. 
(b) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patiently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
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by the applicable state law; and, 
(c) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, at page 431. 
The Court stated: 
"If a state law that regulates obscene material is 
thus limited, as written or construed, the First 
Amendment values applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequ-
ately protected by the ultimate power of appellate 
courts to conduct an independent review of con-
stitutional claims when necessary." at page 431. 
In the wake of the Miller family of cases, there is not 
any predictable application of the Utah statute to the plain-
tiff's commercial activities in distributing sexually oriented 
materials without concrete legislative guidelines within the 
mandate of Miller. The inherent vagueness of the existing 
definition of obscenity in 76-10-1204, Utah Code Annota-
ted, is not Constitutionally tolerable because of the holding 
in Miller. First Amendment freedoms need breathing space 
to survive; government may regulate in the area only with 
narrow specificity. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 
at 311 (1940); NAACP v. Button, 371, U.S. 415 at 432433 
(1963). 
When a statute is void-for-vagueness both in the sense 
that it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden and be-
cause it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrest and con-
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victions, it must be held unconstitutional. Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839,843 
(1972.) 
The problems of fair notice and chilling protected 
speech are very grave by the existence of the statute. The 
defendants are intimidated from exercising their First 
Amendment rights without the fair notice and definitive-
ness required since Miller. The vague, abstract definitions 
of obscenity in the statute carry no precision in proscribing 
specific sexual conduct. The meaning of the statutory con-
cepts of obscenity now existing must necessarily vary with 
the experience, outlook, and even idiosyncrasies of the per-
son defining them. Miller does not permit the vagueness 
that now exists by the threatening enforcement of 76-10-
1204, Utah Code Annotated. The appellants are manifestly 
unable to describe in advance, by reference to these laws, 
the distinction between protected and unprotected speech. 
The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that 
"Constitutionally protected expression ... is often seperated 
from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line." Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 at 66 (1963). The "dim 
and uncertain line" is precisely what Miller requires be 
eradicated from future obscenity litigation and the exist-
ing statute. 
In the Ogden City Court's memorandum decision 
when initially finding the appellants guilty, Judges Ziegler 
and Taylor, (Roth did not participate), held that the words 
nudity and sex as used in 76-10-1203 of the Utah Code, 
would not in and of themselves meet the constitutional 
test of Miller. The City Court then construed nudity and 
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sex, adopting the definitions set forth in 76-10-1202 of the 
Utah Code. 
It in interesting to note that those definitions relied on 
by the City Court specifically apply only to the sale of 
material to minors, if it were the legislature's intention to 
have those definitions apply to the section under which the 
appellants have been charged, why were the definitions 
restricted to the statute which deals only with the sale of 
harmful material to minors? See Utah Code Annotated 76-
10-1206, 1953, as amended. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that all criminal laws provide fair notice of "what 
the State commands or forbids." See Justice Brennan's 
dissenting opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 37 L. 
Ed. 446 (1973), citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 453 
(1969); Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 
U.S. 385 (1962). Also see Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 
313 (1972), requiring that the definition of obscenity must 
provide adequate notice of exactly what is prohibited from 
dissemination. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, commented upon the inability of 
"fair notice" ever being established in obscenity statutes 
by stating: 
"In this context, even the most painstaking 
efforts to determine in advance whether certain 
sexually oriented expression is obscene must in-
evitably prove unavailing. For the insufficiency 
of the notice compels persons to guess not only 
whether their conduct is covered by a criminal 
statute, but also whether their conduct falls with-
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in the constitutionally permissable reach of the 
statute. The resulting level of uncertainty is 
utterly intolerable, not alone because it makes 
'(b)ookselling ... a hazardous profession,' Gins-
berg v. New York, 390 U.S., at 674 (Fortas, J., 
dissenting), but as well because it invites arbitr-
ary and erratic enforcement of the law. (Citing 
cases.)" at 475. 
The appellants are required to act at their peril because 
of the vagueness and overbreadth of the statute. This is an 
intolerable consequence as a result of the cases decided by 
the Supreme Court on June 21, 1973, which now compels 
that 76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated, be declared un-
constitutional. No person, not even the most learned 
judge much less the appellants, are capable of knowing in 
advance of exercising their First Amendment rights what 
sexual conduct will pass without prosecution under the 
statute attacked herein. Because of the abstract definition 
of obscenity that exists in this statute, it is facially uncon-
stitutional within the meaning of Miller v. California. There 
can be no probability of regularity in proscribing sexually 
oriented materials until the Utah legislature establishes con-
crete legislation in this area similar to that suggested by 
Chief Justice Burger referring to the Oregon and Hawaii 
Statutes. See Miller v. California, footnote 6. To further 
highlight the chilling effect that the present status of the 
law has upon the appellants' First Amendment rights, it is 
possible that the legislature may ultimately pass laws allow-
ing adults access to any sexually explicit material^ so long 
as the disseminator insultes such materials from unwilling 
recipients and minors. 
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Part II of the Miller decision does not attempt to de-
fine what is required by a judicial body in authoritatively 
construing obscenity statutes. In Justice Brennan's dissent-
ing opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, Part IV, 
footnote 13, he stated: 
"While the Court's modification of the Memoirs 
test is small, it should still prove sufficient to in-
validate virtually every state law relating to the 
suppression of obscenity. For under the Court's 
restatement, a statute must specifically enumerate 
certain forms of sexual conduct, the depiction of 
which is to be prohibited. It seems highly doubt-
ful to me that state courts will be able to construe 
state statutes so as to incorporate a carefully 
itemized list of various forms of sexual conduct, 
and thus to bring them into conformity with the 
Court's requirements. Cf. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 
U.S. 410, 419 (1971). The statutes of at least one 
State should, however, escape the wholesale 
validation. Oregon has recently revised its statute 
to prohibit only the distribution of obscene 
materials to juveniles or unconsenting adults. 
The enactment of this principle is, of course, a 
choice constitutionally open to every State even 
under the Court's decision. See Oregon Laws, 
1971, c 743, Art. 29." at 480. 
It is clear from a reading of Miller v. California that 
the California Obscenity Statute did not satisfy Chief Just-
ice Burger's requirement that state statutes must be specifi-
cally definitive in describing proscribed sexual conduct. 
Appellants respectfully submit that neither this Court nor 
any other court of competent jurisdiction can supply, by 
authoritative judicial construciton, the specific definition 
in 76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Under the present status of the law, we have a statute 
which sweeps in a great variety of conduct under a general 
and indefinite, abstract characterization of the "obscene." 
Such a situation leaves the executive and judicial branches 
too wide a discretion in applying the statute. Ashton v. 
Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 199 (1966). 
The appellants place significant emphasis upon Blount 
v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); United States v. Evans, 333 
U.S. 483 (1948); and Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 
U.S. 500 (1964). 
In Blount v. Rizzi, supra, the Postmaster General, 
pursuant to a federal statute, invoked administrative hearings 
to halt the appellee's use of the mails in distributing alleged 
obscene materials or from receiving postal money orders 
for payment of the materials. After an administrative hear-
ing, publications in question were found to be obscene. Two 
seperate three-judge courts were convened and held that 
the federal statute was unconstitutional on its face for fail-
ing to provide "prompt judicial review" within a brief 
period of time to prevent the administrative decision from 
achieving an effect of finality. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the Government suggested that the Constitutional 
questions raised by the failure of the statute to provide 
prompt judicial review be saved by construing the statute 
to deny the administrative order any effect until judicial 
review was sought by the distributor. In rejecting the 
Government's position, the Court stated: 
"... it is for Congress, not this Court, to rewrite 
the statute." 
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Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. at 420. 
In ILS. v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948), the defendants 
had been charged with harboring aliens in violation of a 
federal statute. The District Court dismissed the indictment 
on the basis that the statute did not specify with any clarity 
the punishment that was to be prescribed for the offense. 
On appeal, the government argued that the legislative intent 
to proscribe the conduct was clear and that the ambiguity 
concerning the penalty could be resolved by construction 
of the statute. In opposing the Government's position, the 
defendants contended that the task of resolving the 
difficulty went beyond dispelling ambiguity in the usual 
sense of judicially construing statutes and, if attempted, 
would require the Supreme Court to invade the legislative 
function and, in effect, fix the penalty." The Government's 
preferred reading of the statute was rejected by the 
Supreme Court. In affirming the dismissal of the indictment, 
the Court stated: 
"In our system, so far at least as concerns the 
federal powers, defining crimes and fixing penal-
ties are legislative, not judicial functions. 
"But to resolve it broadside (the ambiguity in the 
statutes) now for all cases the section may cover, 
on this indirect presentation, would be to pro-
ceed in an essentially legislative manner for the 
definition and specification of the criminal acts, 
in order to make a judicial determination of the 
scope and character of the penalty. 
3|e >|c ^ ^ c :+c 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
"It may well be, as the Government infers, that 
this only increases the mystery of Congress' fail-
ure to include explicit penalties when it added 
the new offenses. It is possible that Congress may 
have thought none were needed. But that view 
hardly explains satisfactorily the subsequent 
repeated failure to clarify the matter, after ex-
perience had shown that need. We cannot take 
them as importing clear direction to the courts 
to do what Congress itself either refused or failed 
on notice to do upon so many occasions and 
opportunities. 
"With both of the parties we agree that Congress 
meant to make criminal and to punish acts of 
concealing or harboring. But we do not know, we 
can only guess with too large a degree of un-
certainity, which one of the several possible con-
structions Congress thought to apply. 
"This is a task outside the bounds of judicial 
interpretation. It is better for Congress, and more 
in accord with its function, to revise the statute 
than for us to guess at the revision it would make. 
That task it can do with precision. We could do 
no more than make speculation law. 
ILS. v. Evans, 333 U.S. at 486, 490, 492, 495. 
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 
(1964), the Supreme Court held that the federal statute 
denying Communists the right to obtain passports for 
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foreign travel was overbroad and unconstitutional. In re-
fusing to save the statute, the Court observed: 
"It must be remembered that although this court 
will often strain to construe legislation so as to 
save it against constitutional attack, it must not 
and will not carry this to the point of perverting 
the purpose of a statute ... or judicially rewriting 
it. (Citing cases.) To put the matter another way, 
this court will not consider the abstract question 
of whether Congress might have enacted a valid 
statute but instead must ask whether the statute 
that Congress did enact will permissibly bear a 
construction rendering it free from constitutional 
defects. 
'The clarity and preciseness of the provision in 
question makes it impossible to narrow its indis-
criminately cast and overly broad scope without 
substantially rewrite." 
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. at 515. 
Within the reading of Miller v. California, 76-10-1204, 
Utah Code Annotated may only be saved under the guise of 
judicial construction. It is respectfully submitted that it 
would be improper for this Honorable Court to undertake 
such a legislative function, as such action would be contrary 
to the holdings in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); 
United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948); and Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 
Miranda v. Hicks (U.S. District Court California) de-
cided June 4, 1974, also gives insight as to judicial con-
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struction of a statute and the sufficiency of the California 
statute in particular. In Hicks the three-judge panel for the 
Ninth Circuit declared the California statute in light of 
Miller unconstitutional on its face and that the judicial con-
struction given to the statute post Miller was not sufficient 
to meet the fair notice requirements of Miller. Reference is 
also made in the Hicks case to other state statutes which 
have been declared unconstitutionally vague in light of Miller, 
In Hicks, the United States District Court said, "Given 
the particularities that the California statute is missing on 
its face, it may be that such an undertaking would go be-
yond the pale of judicial construction and cross over into 
the realm of legislative drafting." 
The Hicks court also rejected the argument made by 
the State that United States v. 12 200 foot Reels of Film 
permits the type of construction urged upon this Court by 
stating: 
"If the Supreme Court by that passing reference 
was announcing new boundaries for the legislative 
and judicial domains, it is clear that it at best 
applies only to the particular power the Supreme 
Court has to construe federal statues. Without 
more, that narrow statement can be of no relev-
ance to this determination. For the example of 
another court unwilling to construe this foot-
note as an invitation to repose legislative power 
in the judiciary, see the opinion of the Loisiana 
Supreme Court in Louisiana v. Shreveport News 
Agency, Inc., 42 U.S.L.W. 2344 (January 8, 
1974)." 
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Other jurisdictions have construed obscenity statutes 
and ordinances in light of Miller v. California. See Mohney 
v. Indiana, 300 N.E. 2d 66 (1973); Stroud v. Indiana, 300 
N.E. 2d 100, (1973); Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. Cryan,three 
judge court (D.C.NJ. July 26, 1973); Redlich v. Capri 
Cinema, 347 N.Y.S. 2d 811, (1973); Papp v. Florida, 281 
So. 2d 600, (1973); United States v. Lang, 361 F. Supp. 
380 (1973); and Literature, Inc. et al v. Quinn, 482 F. 2d 
(1973). 
The appellants respectfully call this Court's attention 
to the most significant pronouncement of the Indiana 
Supreme Court in Mohney v. Indiana, 300 N.E. 2d 66, and 
Stroud v. Indiana, 300 N.E. 2d 100, (1973). In Mohney. 
supra, and Stroud, supra, the Indiana Supreme Court in a 
pre-Miller decision held the Indiana Obscenity Statute to 
be constitutional and affirmed the trial court convictions 
of Stroud and Mohney. See Stroud v. State, 273 N.E. 2d 
842, (1971), and Mohney v. State, 276 N.E. 2d 517 (1971). 
A Petition for Certiorari was granted by the United States 
Supreme Court and on June 25, 1973, the judgments of the 
Indiana Supreme Court were vacated and remanded for 
further consideration in light of Miller v. California. See 
Strqud_v. Indiana, 93 S.Ct. 3038 (1973), and Mohney v. 
Indiana, S.Ct. 3040 (1973). On remand, the Indiana 
Supreme Court after citing the United States Supreme 
Court obscenity decision of June 21, 1973, held: 
"The main thrust of these opinions, so far as 
applicable to his case, is that the statute under 
which the appellant was convicted is uncon-
stitutional for the reason that it is too general in 
nature and does not set out specific, the sexual 
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or obscene acts which, when depicted in any of 
the media named by the statute, constitute a 
violation of the statute. 
"Pursuant to the order and direction of the 
United States Supreme Court we hold the statute 
involved in this case as unconstitutional on the 
grounds announced by that court." 
Stroud, supra, and Mohney, supra, slip op. page 2. 
The appellants also contend that of the three guide-
lines required as a minimum of every state statute in Miller, 
the new Utah law is totally silent with respect to the re-
quirements that (b) the material is patently offensive; and (c) 
the material lacks serious, literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. Remember, this is required as a minimum. 
Utah does allow as an affirmative defense to the charge 
of distributing pornographic material, distribution of 
material when restricted to institutions or persons having 
scientific, educational, governmental, or other similar 
justifications for possessing pornographic material. See 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-10-1208, 1953, as 
amended. The State may argue that this section satisfies 
the (c) requirement of Miller. In fact it does not even come 
close. It was never intended by the Miller requirement to 
make it a burden of proof of the defendant, but a burden 
of limitation of the State in constitutional statutory 
construction. Furthermore, Section 1208 is referring to 
pornographic material which can legally be distributed and 
the Miller requirement, by definition, is creating a minimum 
standard for material to constitutionally be declared pornog-
graphic vel non. 
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In other words, in Utah it would be legal to sell 
material that was in fact pornographic under the Miller 
requirements, so long as it was sold for the purposes refer-
red to in section 1208. While there may be some value in 
that section, it certainly does not contain the Miller 
criteria as to whether material is pornographic vel non. 
It cannot be argued by the State that the material 
sold by the appellants would be in violation of the Miller 
requirements anyway, and therefore, they would not be 
prejudiced by conviction, even if Utah's statute were lack-
ing in some particulars. It was held in Lewis v. New Orleans, 
39 L. Ed. 2d 214 at 219 (1974) that, "when statutes regul-
ate or proscribe speech and when no readily apparent con-
struction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the 
statutes in a single prosecution; ... the transcendent value 
to all society of constitutionally protected expression is 
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad 
statutes with no requirement that the person making the 
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be 
regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow 
specifically." 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76 10-1204, 1953, as 
amended, is unconstitutional on its face by failing to 
conform to the procedural and specificity requirements of 
Miller v. California,, 
Respectfully submitted, 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Appellants 
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